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STATE LAW INDEPENDENCE AND THE ADEQUATE
AND INDEPENDENT STATE GROUNDS
DOCTRINE AFTER MICHIGAN v. LONG
A basic tenet of federalism is that state courts are the final arbiters of
state law.' To avoid reviewing questions of state law, the Supreme
Court limits its jurisdiction to cases in which a federal question is nec-
essary to the state court's decision.2 Thus the Court will not review
state court decisions that purport to decide federal questions if, in the
Court's view,' adequate and independent state law grounds support the
judgment.4
The adequate and independent nonfederal grounds doctrine5 pro-
motes jurisdictional and constitutional restraint.6 The Supreme Court
has employed the rule to guard against advisory opinions,7 to avoid
premature or needless decision of constitutional issues,8 and to foster
1. See, e.g.. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 107, at 747 (4th ed. 1983);
Greene, Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts, 83 HARV. L. REv. 289, 289 (1969).
2. Eg.. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908); Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361 (1893).
In 1875 the Supreme Court established the rule that it does not have jurisdiction to review state
court decisions interpreting state law. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590
(1875). For a discussion of Murdock, see infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
3. The Supreme Court always has jurisdiction to decide whether a state court judgment rests
on a nonfederal ground and whether that ground is adequate and independent. Wolfe v. North
Carolina, 364 U.S. 177, 186 (1960); Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 773 (1931); 16 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4021,
at 675-76 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
4. R. ROBERTSON & F. KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES § 89, at 163 (R. Wolfson & P. Kurland 2d ed. 1951) (collecting cases stating the oft-cited
rule); 16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4019, at 661-62 (same). See also C. WRIGHT, supra
note 1, § 107, at 747-48 (summarizing various corollaries to the rule).
5. The rule is styled a number of ways. For the sake of readability, this Note interchangea-
bly uses the terms "adequate and independent state grounds doctrine," "adequate and independ-
ent nonfederal grounds doctrine," and "nonfederal grounds doctrine."
6. See generally 16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4021 (discussing the rationale for the
doctrine).
7. See, e.g., Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194, 197 (1965) (Court
will decline jurisdiction when the possibility exists that on remand the state will reinstate its deci-
sion based on a state ground); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446-67 (1965) (the nonfederal
grounds doctrine avoids advisory opinions); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945) ("if the
same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws,
our review would amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion").
8. See California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 98
(198 1) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (linking a doubt as to jurisdiction because the state court may have
rested its decision on adequate nonfederal grounds with the Court's "traditional practice of avoid-
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judicial efficiency and economy.' More importantly, the adequate and
independent state grounds doctrine protects state law from Supreme
Court intrusion and defines the relationship of the Supreme Court to
state law.'0
When the Court declines review of a state court decision that clearly
rests on state law," the doctrine serves its basic policy goals and en-
sures against unwarranted Supreme Court revision of state law. t2
Complications arise in the application of the doctrine when state courts
fail to indicate the degree to which they relied on federal law.' 3 If the
Court improperly finds jurisdiction, its review of a state court decision
may infringe on the independence of state law' 4 or result in an advisory
opinion.1 5 In large part, therefore, the history of the nonfederal
ing the unnecessary and premature adjudication of constitutional questions"); Black v. Cutter
Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 299-300 (1956) ("even if the State Court's opinion be considered am-
biguous, we should choose the interpretation which does not face us with a constitutional ques-
tion"); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940) (Court vacates and remands state
court decision to ensure that existence of adequate and independent state ground does not render
Court's decision a "needless dissertation[] on constitutional law").
9. See Department of Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U.S. 425, 429 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Note, The Untenable Non-federal Groundin the Supreme Court, 74 HARv. L, REv. 1375, 1379-
80 (1961).
10. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 464 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (nonfederal
grounds rule goes "to the heart of the division of judicial powers in a federal system"); Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945) (reason for rule "found in the partitioning of power between the
state and federal judicial systems"); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940) (rule
"touches the division of authority between state courts and this Court and is of equal importance
to each"). See also Galie & Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and Supreme Court Reiew:"
Justice Marshall's Proposal in Oregon v. Hass, 82 DICK. L. REV. 273, 282 (1978) (rule addresses
"question... of power and where it lies in the federal system"); Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1043, 1056 (1977) (Supreme Court review should be limited to a "marginal intrusion upon
state authority").
11. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S, 45, 53
(1908).
12. See Wechsler, supra note 10, at 1056; supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text; infra notes
38-42 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 48-69 and accompanying text.
14. Infringement can occur when the Court assumes jurisdiction after a state court reversed a
conviction and appeared to rest its determination on both state and federal law. If the state court
actually rested its decision on state law, and the Court reverses the judgment, the Court will have
decided an issue of state law. See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3490 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Herb v. Pitcaim, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945); 16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4021, at 679-
81; infra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
15. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 726, 727 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (urging Court
to use "exacting standard" of jurisdiction to avoid advisory opinions); Department of Mental
Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194, 197 (1965) (danger of advisory opinions should preclude
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss3/8
NONFEDERAL GROUNDS DOCTRINE
grounds doctrine recounts the various methods the Court has devel-
oped for determining when it may properly exercise its jurisdiction in
ambiguous cases.16
Recent Supreme Court decisions culminating in Michigan v. Long 7
have changed the means by which the Court implements the adequate
and independent state grounds doctrine. 8 In Long, the Court created a
presumption that ambiguous state court decisions rest on federal law
and thus are subject to Supreme Court review.'9 In Long and its pre-
cursors, the Court altered the balance between itself and state judiciar-
ies,20 redefined the independence of state law,2 ' and precipitated
potentially important changes in the jurisdictional interests protected
by the nonfederal grounds doctrine.22
Part I of this Note examines the history of the nonfederal grounds
doctrine and traces the development of the Court's various approaches
to state court decisions exhibiting ambiguous grounds of decision.23
Part II discusses the Court's recent treatment of the doctrine, the deci-
sion and holding in Michigan v. Long, and Long's impact on the operA-
tion and rationale of the nonfederal grounds doctrine.24 In part III,
this Note considers and assesses possible state court responses to the
Long rule.25 Finally, in part IV, this Note concludes that the Court
correctly modified the nonfederal grounds doctrine in Long. This Note
also concludes that flexible Supreme Court administration of the Long
rule, along with a conscientious state court response to the Supreme
Court's challenge, will enhance federal-state court relations and con-
Supreme Court jurisdiction unless state court decision rests solely on a federal ground). Seegen-
erally 16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4021, at 688-93 (discussing advisory opinion ration-
ale); Galie & Galie, supra note 10, at 286-87 n.75 (stressing importance of avoiding advisory
opinions as reason for nonfederal ground doctrine). For a discussion of the relationship of the
advisory opinion rationale to the nonfederal grounds doctrine, see infra notes 63-66 & 111-12 and
accompanying text.
16, See infra notes 48-69 and accompanying text. See generally 16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 3, § 4028 (discussing development of methods of ascertaining grounds of decision).
17. 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
18. See infra notes 83-100 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 117-27 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 27-82 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 83-131 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 132-63 and accompanying text.
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tribute to federal and state judicial efficiency.26
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NONFEDERAL GROUNDS
DOCTRINE
Because federal law is interstitial in nature, the role of state law is
constantly evolving.27 The scope of state authority contracts or ex-
pands whenever the Supreme Court redefines federal guarantees or
Congress enacts legislation that changes the extent of federal preemp-
tion of state law. 28 Ultimately, therefore, the federal judiciary's inter-
pretation of the scope of federal law governs the role of state law in the
federal system.29
The adequate and independent state grounds doctrine operates in the
murky area where federal law is not exclusively controlling.30 State
courts frequently can resolve issues on the basis of either federal or
state law or both.3 This freedom of choice complicates any definition
of independence for purpose of the nonfederal grounds doctrine. 32
Within the limits of due process33 and the supremacy clause,34 the
states generally are free to use their own constitutions and laws to ex-
pand the individual freedoms granted by the federal constitution.35
The adequate and independent state grounds doctrine protects this
freedom to the extent that it prevents the Supreme Court from impos-
26. See infra text accompanying notes 164-65.
27. P. BATOR, D. SHAPIRO, P. MISHKIN & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 470-71 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART &
WECHSLER]; Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 497-98
(1954).
28. See Hart, supra note 27, at 525-38 (discussing effect of changes in federal law on role of
state law); see also Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1334, 1337-40 (1982) (giving examples of federal judicial and legislative
action and its effect on state law).
29. See 16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4021, at 675-76.
30. Id at 676.
31. Id
32. See id § 4209, at 747-48; cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. Hamilton) (discussing concur-
rent jurisdiction and state courts' ability to decide questions of state and federal law).
33. See U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
34. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
35. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 375-77 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (states should be free to experiment with "procedural alternatives" in criminal law); New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.").
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ing uniform federal law on the states.3 6 The Court's evaluation of the
independence of an asserted state ground largely determines the extent
of this protection: the higher the standard the Court sets for finding
independence, the smaller the field of state court authority. 7
A. Early Cases
Since it decided Murdock v. Memphis 38 in 1875, the Supreme Court
has declined to revise the judgments of state courts on state law.39 In
Murdock, the Court held that if a state court of last resort decides a
federal question against a person claiming a federal right, the Court
will review the federal question.' Under the Murdock rule, the Court
would affirm the decision of the state court if it found that the state
court had correctly decided the federal question.41 If the Court found
that the state court had incorrectly decided the federal issue, the Court
would search for an adequate and independent state ground to support
the judgment. If such a state ground existed, the Court would affirm;
36. See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road
Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487, 489 (1965); Developments in the Law, supra note 28, at 1335.
37. For cases in which the Court has applied a stringent standard for judging the inde-
pendence of state law, see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). For a discussion of the Court's modem tendency to accord
less deference to the independence of state law, see infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. See
also Developments in the Law, supra note 28, at 1340 (arguing that increased Supreme Court scru-
tiny of the independence of state court decisions dilutes nonfederal grounds doctrine); Address by
Hon. Sandra D. O'Connor, The National Judicial College, Reno, Nev. (May 13, 1983), quoted in
State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316, 1323 n.10 (1983) (acknowledging modem tendency
of Supreme Court to find no independent state ground).
38. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). The Court in Murdock addressed the question whether it
had the power to review state court decisions in light of an 1867 amendment to the Judiciary Act
of 1789. The 1789 Act explicitly confined the Court to review of questions involving the federal
constitution or federal laws and treaties. The Judiciary Act of 1867 deleted this provision. For a
comparison of the two statutory provisions, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 439-40.
The state court had decided the case confronting the Murdock Court on both state and federal
grounds. The state court rejected the plaintiffs claim to title to certain land both on the ground
that the state statute of limitations had run and that an Act of Congress had intended to vest title
unconditionally in the defendant. The plaintiff argued that the Supreme Court had the power to
review both questions. Review of state court decisions of state law may be constitutional, see C.
WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 746, and may have been intended by the framers of the Constitution, see
2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES chs.
23-26 (1953).
39. 16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4020, at 665; Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and
the Adequate State Ground- Proposalsfor a Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 187, 188.
40. 87 U.S. at 635; see 16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4020, at 665.
41. 87 U.S. at 635; see 16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4020, at 665-66.
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otherwise, it would reverse.42
In Eustis v. Bolles,43 the Court abandoned its practice of initially re-
viewing a state court's disposition of federal issues.44 Instead, in Eustis,
the Court first ascertained whether the state court's decision rested on
an adequate and independent nonfederal ground.4  The Court found a
sufficient basis for the decision under state law and accordingly dis-
missed the case as beyond its jurisdiction.46 Eustis thus established the
modem pattern of analysis.47
B. Methods of Disposition
Decisions since Murdock have focused on refining the Court's ap-
proach to state court rulings exhibiting ambiguous grounds of deci-
sion.48 Case-law development has been haphazard,49 however, because
the Court has rarely explored the jurisdictional and federalism con-
cers underlying the doctrine." Although principled grounds may ex-
ist for choosing one method of disposition over another,5' the Court's
42. 87 U.S. at 635-36; see 16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4020, at 665-66.
43. 150 U.S. 361 (1893).
44. The Court approached this change in terms of the proper method for disposition of a case
in which the federal issue was not dispositive. The Court noted that in earlier cases in which it
had followed the Murdock approach, it had occasionally affirmed state court judgments, notwith-
standing that it found an incorrectly decided federal issue. Id at 370; see supra notes 41-42 and
accompanying text.
45. 150 U.S. at 370.
46. Id
47. 16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4020, at 666. Numerous cases illustrate this pat-
tern. See, e.g., Fox Film v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935); Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. Northern
Realty Co., 244 U.S. 300 (1917); Allen v. Arquimbaw, 198 U.S. 149 (1905).
48. E.g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940) (endorsing the vacating and
remanding of ambiguous state decisions); International Steel & Iron Co. v. National Sur. Co., 297
U.S. 657 (1936) (granting continuance to allow parties to clarify basis for state court decision);
Lynch v. New York ex rel Pierson, 293 U.S. 52 (1934) (explaining why dismissal proper when
Court's jurisdiction is in doubt). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 78-83 (dis-
cussion of various techniques); 16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4032 (reviewing the history
of each method of disposition); Note, Supreme Court Treatment of State Court Cases Exhibiting
Ambiguous Grounds of Decision, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 822, 835-45 (1962) (in-depth examination of
each method).
49. See Note, supra note 48, at 842-48 (criticizing the Court's lack of consistency).
50. See id at 847-48. In Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945), the Court advanced several
theoretical bases for the non-federal grounds doctrine. The Court, however, has rarely used these
theories to guide its choice of one method of disposition over another. See HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 27, at 482. For a discussion of Herb, see infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
51. See 16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4032, at 778-79. (suggesting that in deciding
the proper approach to an ambiguous decision the Court should consider the efforts of the parties
to establish the Court's jurisdiction, the likelihood that the state court rested its decision on federal
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss3/8
NONFEDERAL GROUNDS DOCTRINE
approach reflects primarily a desire for flexibility rather than doctrinal
consistency. 2
Until the mid-1930's dismissal remained the Court's principal
method of disposing of state court decisions that clearly or possibly
rested on an adequate and independent state ground.53 The notion that
the parties must prove jurisdiction underlies this approach. If the rec-
ord did not affirmatively demonstrate grounds for jurisdiction, the par-
ties had failed to satisfy their burden of proof and review was
inappropriate. 54 Dismissal therefore involved a presumption that state
court decisions exhibiting ambiguous grounds of decision rested on an
adequate and independent state ground.5
In 1940, the Court began to vacate and remand state court judgments
for clarification of the grounds of decision.56 The Court adopted this
approach in Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 57 reasoning that forcing
state courts to articulate the basis for their decisions minimized the pos-
sibility of Supreme Court intrusion into the province of state law and
prevented the Court from indulging in "needless dissertations on con-
stitutional law."58 Vacating and remanding state court decisions also
insured that "ambiguous or obscure adjudications" by state courts did
not preclude review of federal issues.59
During this period, the Court began to grant continuances to allow
the parties to seek a certificate from the state court evidencing the basis
grounds, the possibility of undue delay, and the "ripeness" of the federal issue for present
jurisdiction).
52. See Note, supra note 48, at 849 (ad hoc approach allows Court to avoid "thorny federal
questions").
53. Id at 835.
54. See Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 281 (1956); Lynch v. New York ex rel Pierson, 293
U.S. 52, 55 (1934); Johnson v. Risk, 137 U.S. 300, 307 (1890); Note, supra note 48, at 835-36.
55. See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3489 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Durley v.
Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 281 (1956); Lynch v. New York ex rel Pierson, 293 U.S. 52, 55 (1934);
Johnson v. Risk, 137 U.S. 300,307 (1890). The Court's disposition in Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct.
3469 (1983), creates the opposite presumption. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
56. C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 752 & n.96. The Court has followed this approach on nu-
merous occasions. See, e.g., California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972) (per curiam); Department of
Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965); Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143 (1952); Minnesota
v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940). For a general discussion of this method, see Note, supra
note 48, at 836-40.
57. 309 U.S. 551 (1940).
58. Id at 557.
59. Id But cf. Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143, 147 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (questioning
whether Court has power to vacate and remand when its jurisdiction is uncertain).
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for its decision.60 In Herb v. Picairn,61 the Court strongly endorsed this
approach, asserting that asking, rather than telling, state courts what
they had held best served the interests of federalism. 62
The Herb Court also considered the possibility that Supreme Court
review of ambiguous state court decisions might result in advisory
opinions.63 The Court reasoned that if it presumed that a state court
decision rested on a federal ground, the state court could reassert a
state ground of decision on remand.64 In that event, the Supreme
Court's decision would not be dispositive of the parties' rights and
would be merely advisory.65 According to the Herb Court, the risk of
advisory opinions supported seeking clarification of the state court's
basis of decision.66
The Court's development of vacation and remand and continuance
for clarification to resolve ambiguities in state decisions presupposed
that the state court was the appropriate body to determine the basis for
its own decision.67 Nevertheless, the Court occasionally has under-
60. This technique originated in International Steel & Iron Co. v. National Sur. Co., 297 U.S.
657 (1936). See 16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4031, at 776-77; Note, supra note 48, at
840-41. The Court has employed this method of disposition on other occasions. See, e.g.,
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Loftus v. Illinois, 334 U.S. 804 (1948).
61. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
62. Id at 127-28. Prior to Herb, the Court permitted parties to submit a certificate from the
state court, stating that the decision rested on a federal question. See, e.g., Indiana ex rel. Ander-
son v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 99 (1938); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 361 (1927). The law of
certificates is complex, involving, for example, what the certificate must say and who must sign it.
See 16 WRiGr & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4032, at 775-76; Wolfson & Kurland, Cert#Fcares by
State Courts of the Existence of a Federal Question, 63 HARV. L. REV. 111 (1949).
63. 324 U.S. at 126.
64. Id
65. Id See also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 726 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Court
should carefully consider risk of advisory opinions when it reviews state decisions to correct state
court interpretation of federal law); Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194, 197
(1965) (Court will not take jurisdiction when possibility exists that on remand the state court will
reinstate its prior decision on a state ground basis); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 465 (1963) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (urging that risk of advisory opinions constitutes constitutional support for ade-
quate and independent state grounds doctrine). For general discussions of the relationship be-
tween the advisory opinion doctrine and the nonfederal grounds doctrine, see 16 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 3, § 4021, at 688-93; infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
66. 324 U.S. at 126. Some states have statutes permitting certification of questions from fed-
eral courts to the state supreme court. Use of the certification technique by the Supreme Court
accomplishes the same ends as vacation and remand or continuance for clarification. See, e.g.,
Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410 (1982); Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963).
67. See, eg., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945) (Court should defer to state courts on
questions of state law); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940) (vacating and
remanding ensures that responsibility for decision is "fairly placed").
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taken to determine for itself whether a state court's decision rests on an
adequate and independent state ground.68  Although this practice be-
gan in 1917,69 it has become increasingly prevalent within the last ten
years.70
C Modern Scrutiny
The Court usually considers two criteria in determining the indepen-
dence of a state ground of decision.7 First, the Court scrutinizes the
state court's decision to determine whether the asserted state law
ground is sufficiently interwoven with, and thus not independent of,72
federal law. Alternatively, the Court examines the state court's reason-
ing to determine whether the state court's perception of federal law
compelled its ruling.7 3 If the Court makes either finding, it will assume
68. See. e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1979) (Court examined state court
decision and prior decisions of state supreme court to determine whether citation to state constitu-
ion indicated an adequate and independent state ground); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad-
casting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568 (1977) (examination of state court decision demonstrated that state
court felt compelled by federal law to interpret state law as it did); Enterprise Irr. Dist. v. Farmers
Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917) (Court will examine state law ground of decision to
determine if it is so interwoven with federal law as not to be independent); HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 27, at 482.
69. See Enterprise Irr. Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917); 16
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4029, at 748-49.
70. See, ag., Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 671 (1982); Washington v. Chrisman, 455
U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (1982); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1979); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568 (1977).
Justice O'Connor recently made the following remarks:
Recently, there has been a tendency for the Supreme Court to find no independent state
ground and to assert its power to review if it appears that both federal and state constitu-
tional provisions are cited by the state court, that the state cases generally follow the
federal interpretation, and the state court does not clearly and expressly articulate its
separate reliance on state grounds.
Address of Hon. Sandra D. O'Connor at The National Judicial College, Reno, Nev. (May 13,
1983).
71. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. The Court occasionally considers other
factors in determining the independence of state grounds of decision. See, e.g., Konigsberg v.
State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 254-58 (1957) (Court examined the state court's opinion and held
that no state ground for the California court's decision was independent of federal law).
72. The Court first employed this approach in Enterprise Irr. Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal
Co., 243 U.S. 157 (1917). See also Abie State Bank v. Weaver, 282 U.S. 765 (1931) (close connec-
tion between state procedural ground and federal law justifies Supreme Court review).
73. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568 (1977); United
Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623, 630-31 (1973); Missouri ex rel Southern Ry. v. Mayfield,
340 U.S. 1, 4 (1950). A leading commentary contends that Supreme Court review is entirely ap-
propriate in this situation because the state court has not "properly understood [its] indepen-
dence." 16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4029, at 751-52. Thus when a state court has acted
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jurisdiction and review the state court decision.74
The Burger Court's increased scrutiny of state court decisions con-
serves time and judicial resources by eliminating the need for further
state court consideration of its grounds of decision."5 The Court's ap-
proach, however, presents several problems that obscure its advantages.
The Court's level of scrutiny is likely to result in advisory opinions
because the Supreme Court effectively presumes that a state court deci-
sion rests on federal law.76 In addition, this approach intrudes upon
the independence of state law because the Supreme Court determines
what the state court held. 7
The most significant problem is one of definition. Because the War-
ren Court expanded federal equal protection, due process, and criminal
procedural guarantees, the seminal precedent in important areas of
constitutional law consists of Supreme Court decisions. 78 Thus, state
law has become increasingly interwoven with federal law, and, argua-
bly, less independent as state courts have applied federal precedents to
new fact situations. Even when a state court wishes to maintain the
independence of its own constitution, the necessity of citation to federal
precedent contributes to the ambiguity in the basis for a state court's
judgment.79
under perceived complusion of federal law, the proper course for the Court is to decide the federal
issue and remand the case to the state court. Id
74. See Developments in the Law, supra note 28, at 1341. But see Jankovich v. Indiana Toll
Road Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487 (1965) (Court found that the state ground of decision was inextrica-
bly interwoven with federal law, but nevertheless refused to review).
75. Cf. Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143 (1952) (Court heard argument and granted two continu-
ances before vacating and remanding the state court's judgment because the state court denied it
had the power to clarify a case in the Supreme Court).
76. The Court never admitted this presumption prior to its decision in Michigan v. Long, 103
S. Ct. 3469 (1983). But cf. South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916, 925 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that Court's independent examination of state law ground invites presumption of
state law dependency on federal law). For a discussion of the advisory opinion rationale, see
supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text; infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
77. The intrusion results because the Supreme Court substitutes itself for the state court as
the final arbiter of state law, implicitly claiming the right to interpret state law in the future. See
16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4021, at 679; c.Project Report, Towardan Activist Rolefor
State Bills of Rights., 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 271, 314 (1973) (state law ground is independent
whenever the state court declares that it is); Developments in the Law, supra note 28, at 1336 (ade-
quate and independent state grounds rule concerned with assertion of independence by the state
court).
78. See Developments in the Law, supra note 28, at 1336, 1350; V.c Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356, 375-77 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (states should be free to experi-
ment with "procedural alternatives" in criminal law).
79. Developments in the Law, supra note 28, at 1336. For a particularly graphic example of
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In the Warren Court era, state courts that disagreed with Supreme
Court expansion of constitutional guarantees often evaded the Court's
decrees by using state procedural law to thwart implementation of fed-
eral rights.8" In response, the Supreme Court restricted its definition of
an adequate state ground."' Commentators have argued that state
courts have attempted to evade the Burger Court's dilution of Warren
era precedents by interpreting state constitutional guarantees more ex-
pansively than their federal counterparts.82
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND MICHIGAN V LONG
Members of the Supreme Court have vigorously debated the proper
function of the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine.83 In
the Supreme Court's use of this tendency to find jurisdiction, see Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S.
667, 670-71 (1982) (Court examined state decision cited by state court and found controlling fed-
eral precedent).
80. See, e.g., Beatty, State Court Evasion of the United States Supreme Court Mandates During
the Last Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAL. U.L. REv. 260 (1972). Professor Beatty cites Sullivan
v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 392 U.S. 657 (1968) as an example of the state court response. Sulli-
van involved the refusal by a nonprofit corporation that operated a community park to allow a
member of the corporation to lease his share to a black. The Virginia Court of Appeals refused to
hear the case because plaintiffs attorney had not complied with a state rule requiring written
notice of appeal to opposing counsel of the filing papers involved in the appeal. The Supreme
Court vacated the judgment and remanded to the state court to reconsider its decision in light of
the Court's recent decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). On remand, the
Virginia court adhered to its view that the plaintiffs procedural default barred consideration of his
case. 209 Va. 279, 163 S.E.2d 588 (1968). The plaintiff took the case to the Supreme Court again,
and the Court reversed on the merits, holding that the Virginia court had applied its procedural
rule too stringently against the plaintiffs. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229
(1969); Beatty, supra, at 264-65. For a discussion of state court efforts to evade Supreme Court
decisions in an earlier period, see Note, Evasion of Supreme Court Mandates in Cases Remandedto
State Courts Since 1941, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1251 (1954).
81. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965) (state procedural grounds inadequate un-
less they serve a "legitimate state interests"); see also Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1965) (criticizing Court's setting of a lower standard for procedural as op-
posed to substantive grounds); Sandalow, supra note 38 (discussing impact of Henry).
82. See, e.g., Falk, The Supreme Court of California, 1971-1972-Forward: The State Consti-
tution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (1973); Wilkes, The
New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421
(1974); Note, State Constitutional Guarantees as Adequate State Ground- Supreme Court Review
and Problems of Federalism, 13 AM. CRtM. L. REv. 737 (1976). Cf. Brennan, State Constitutions
and the Frotection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977) (Supreme Court Justice urg-
ing state supreme courts to provide greater protection of individual rights through expansive inter-
pretations of state constitutional guarantees). For a collection of commentary on the modern state
court tendency to give independent meanings to state constitutional provisions, see Developments
Mu the Law, supra note 28, at 1328 n.20.
83. See Florida v. Casal, 103 S. Ct. 3100 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring in dismissal of
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particular, Justices Marshall and Stevens have questioned whether re-
cent applications of the doctrine preserve the independence of state
law. 4 Their critique of the doctrine finds expression in a series of dis-
sents culminating in Justice Stevens' dissent in South Dakota v.
Neville.8 5
In Neville, Justice Marshall joined Justice Stevens in asserting that
the adequate and independent state ground doctrine constitutes a rigid
jurisdictional barrier.16  Justice Stevens flatly stated that the Court
lacks power to review state court decisions that rest on both the state
and federal constitutions.8 7 In the dissent's view, the risk of producing
certiorari) (impliedly questioning whether state court should have power to accord criminal de-
fendant greater rights than those prescribed by Supreme Court interpretations of fourth amend-
ment); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 285 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (Court should not decide
federal issue when state law is unsettled and is possibly dispositive of the issue).
Members of the Supreme Court often have disagreed over whether particular cases present an
adequate and independent state ground. Compare, e.g., Montana v. Jackson, 103 S. Ct. 1418
(1983) (impiedly finding adequate and independent state ground) andBlack v. Cutter Laborato-
ries, 351 U.S. 292 (1956) (finding adequate nonfederal ground) with Montana v. Jackson, 103 S.
Ct. 1418, 1418 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Montana court decision clearly based on state law)
andBlack v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 300 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("no doubt" as
to lack of adequate nonfederal ground).
The Justices similarly have debated the proper method of disposition of state court decisions
exhibiting ambiguous grounds of decision. See, e.g., Department of Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410
U.S. 425, 426 (1973) (per curiam) (vacating and remanding for clarification); id at 427 (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (characterizing vacation and remand as an "unhappy" practice); Dixon v. Duffy,
344 U.S. 143, 146 (1952) (vacating and remanding); id at 147 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (Court
should not assume jurisdiction when existence of federal ground of decision is in doubt); Minne-
sota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940) (vacating and remanding); id at 558 (Hughes,
C.J., dissenting) (dismissal is proper approach when federal jurisdiction is uncertain).
84. See South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916, 924 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Califor-
nia ex rel Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 95 (1981) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 726 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85. 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983). See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (discussing Neville).
See also infra note 89 (discussing Justice Stevens' dissent in California ex rel Cooper v. Mitchell
Bros.' Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 94 (1981), and Justice Marshall's dissent in Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714, 726 (1975)).
86. Id at 926 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Id The Court in Neville addressed a South Dakota statute that permitted, at a driver's
trial for driving while intoxicated, the introduction of evidence that the driver had refused to take
a blood alcohol test. The South Dakota Supreme Court held that the introduction of this evidence
violated the privilege against self-incrimination contained in both the fifth amendment to the fed-
eral constitution and article VI, section 9 of the South Dakota Constitution. State v. Neville, 312
N.W.2d 723, 726 (S.D. 1981).
The majority concluded that the South Dakota Supreme Court initially had held that the statute
violated the fifth amendment, and then, without further analysis, had also found a violation of the
state consitution. South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 919 n.5. Justice Stevens thought it clear
that the South Dakota Supreme Court's holding rested independently on the state constitution.
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advisory opinions compels the Court to presume that state law is in-
dependent."8 Justice Stevens reasoned that a contrary presumption
would reduce state constitutions to a "mere shadow" of the federal con-
stitution and engage the Court in "paternalistic" and "unsolicited" re-
vision of state law.89
In Michigan v. Long," the Court emphatically rejected these views.
Substantively, Long addressed a challenge to a Michigan Supreme
Court decision which held that "stop and frisk" searches of persons in
Id at 925 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He found the majority's jurisdictional holding particularly
objectionable because of the South Dakota Supreme Court's declaration in State v. Opperman,
247 N.W.2d 673, 674 (S.D. 1976), on remandfrom 428 U.S. 364 (1976), that the state constitution
has an "independent nature." South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 926 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88. South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 925-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. Id at 925 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court of South Dakota reinstated its former decision on remand from the
Supreme Court, holding that the South Dakota Constitution mandated its result. State v. Neville,
346 N.W.2d 425 (S.D. 1984). The South Dakota court reaffirmed its position in State v. Opper-
man, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976), that the South Dakota Constitution has an "independent na-
ture." 346 N.W.2d at 427. See supra note 87 (discussing Opperman). Supreme Court recognition
of the independence of the South Dakota Constitution remains unclear absent continual reasser-
tions of independence by the South Dakota courts. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
Justices Stevens and Marshall also expressed their views of adequate and independent state
grounds in California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 94 (1981)
(Stevens, J., dissenting), and Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 726 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In Hass, the Supreme Court rejected respondent's argument that a decision of the Oregon
Supreme Court rested on an independent state ground. Id at 719-20. The Court reviewed the
decision on the merits and reversed the state court's holding concerning the scope of the privilege
against self-incrimination. Id at 724. Justice Marshall dissented from the majority's finding that
no sufficient state ground existed. Id at 727-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He asserted that al-
though the opinion of the Oregon court did not mention or cite state law, the decision nevertheless
may have rested on a nonfederal ground. Id
Justice Marshall also expressed concern about the Court's increasing tendency to review state
court decisions that uphold claims of criminal defendants to certain procedural rights under the
Constitution. Id at 726 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He argued that the principal danger inherent in
this practice is the risk of giving advisory opinions. Id In addition, he asserted that Supreme
Court review of state court decisions that enhance criminal procedural rights does not serve any
federal interest. Id at 728-29 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall proposed that the
Supreme Court should concern itself with state court decisions reversing convictions only when
federal law compelled the state court's ruling. Id at 729 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In Cooper, Justice Stevens objected to the majority's decision to review a state court decision
that may have rested on state law. California ex ret Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theater,
454 US. at 95 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens reiterated Justice Marshall's argument that
the risk of giving advisory opinions compels the Court to limit its review to state court decisions
resting solely on federal law. Id at 98 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Department of Mental
Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194, 196 (1965)).
90. 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
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automobiles could not extend to the interior of the car.9' The defend-
ant attempted to prevent Supreme Court review by arguing that the
decision rested on an independent state ground. He asserted that
Michigan courts interpret the Michigan constitution's search and
seizure provision more expansively than the Supreme Court interprets
the fourth amendment.92
In responding to the defendant's contention, the Court reviewed its
traditional methods of resolving ambiguous state court decisions and
found deficiencies in each method.93 First, it found that vacation and
remand and continuance for clarification unduly delay the judicial pro-
cess and burden the state courts.94 Second, the Court stated that dis-
missal of state court decisions resting largely on federal precedent
impedes the development of case law.95 The Court reasoned that fed-
eralism interests require a more consistent approach to ambiguous state
court decisions than the Court's previous "ad hoc" method of
analysis.96
Seeking a solution to these problems, the majority concluded that
recognition of state court independence and appreciation of the danger
of advisory opinions required the Court to enunciate a clear rule.97
The Court held that in reviewing state court cases exhibiting ambigu-
ous grounds of decision, it would presume that the state court had
rested its decision upon federal law.98 To implement this presumption,
91. Id at 3473-74. Sheriff's deputies found Long's car in a ditch by the road in a rural area.
When the deputies approached the car, Long met them at its rear. After repeated requests for
identification from the deputies, Long began to walk toward the car. The deputies then patted
down Long and looked into the car where they saw a large hunting knife. Upon further investiga-
tion of the interior of the automobile, the deputies discovered a pouch of marijuana. A search of
the trunk followed, and the deputies found seventy-five pounds of marijuana. Id For a definition
of a "stop and frisk" search, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
92. 103 S. Ct. at 3474. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the search of the defendant's
vehicle violated "the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. I, § 11 of the
Michigan Constitution." People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 469, 320 N.W.2d 866, 868 (1982).
93. 103 S. Ct. at 3475. For a discussion of the Court's various methods of disposing of am-
biguous state court decisions, see supra notes 48-69 and accompanying text.
94. 103 S. Ct. at 3475.
95. Id
96. Id
97. Id
98. Id at 3476. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, phrased the presumption as follows:
[W]hen. . . a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, and
when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from
the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state
court decided the case the way it did because federal law required it to do so.
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the majority formulated the "plain statement rule."9 9 Under this re-
quirement, a state court may preclude Supreme Court review only if it
"clearly and expressly" indicates that its decision rests on a "bona fide
separate, adequate, and independent" state ground.1°°
In the majority's view, this approach minimizes Supreme Court in-
trusion into state law while allowing for vindication of federal rights
and uniformity of federal law.' 0' In addition, according to the Court,
the presumption that a state court decision does not contain an ade-
quate and independent state ground alleviates the danger of advisory
opinions. 0 2 Thus the Court emphasized clarity and uniformity in fash-
ioning a jurisdictional standard.
Justice Stevens dissented, 0 3 arguing that history and policy com-
Id Cf. Address by Hon. Sandra D. O'Connor at The National Judicial College, Reno, Nev. (May
13, 1983), supra note 69 (using similar language to describe the Court's standard in evaluating the
independence of state court decisions prior to Long).
99. Id The Court's statement of the rule is as follows:
If a state court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the precedents
of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain statement in its judg-
ment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance,
and do not themselves compel the result that the court has reached. In this way, both
justice and judicial administration will be greatly improved. If the state court decision
indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, ade-
quate, and independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision.
Id
100. Id at 3476. The Court applied the rule to the Michigan Supreme Court's decision and
assumed jurisdiction. The Court found that the Michigan court's two unadorned citations to the
Michigan Constitution did not constitute a plain statement. Id at 3477-78. In addition, the Court
analyzed state law to determine whether Michigan courts interpreted the state constitution's
search and seizure provision consistently with the Court's interpretations of the fourth amend-
ment. Id at 3478 n.10. Relying on Michigan precedent, the Court concluded that the procedural
rights of arrested marijuana users under the Michigan constitution are identical to those mandated
by the fourth amendment. Id One commentator has argued that the Court overlooked or ig-
nored Michigan precedent that would have dictated a different result. Collins, Plain Statements:
7he Supreme Court's New Requirement, 70 A.B.A. J. 92, 94 (Mar. 1984).
101. 103 S. Ct. at 3476.
102. Id at 3475-77. The Court did not elaborate its consideration of the advisory opinion
doctrine. Instead, it merely noted that the Long presumption did not "authorize" the rendering of
advisory opinions, id at 3476, and that it was not uncommon for the Court to employ jurisdic-
tional presumptions. Id at 3477 n.8.
103. Id at 3489 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun concurred on the merits, see supra
note 91 and accompanying text, but declined to join the Court in "fashioning a new presumption
of jurisdiction over cases coming here from state courts." 103 S. Ct. at 3483 (Blackmun, J., con-
eurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed with the
majority that the Court properly had jurisdiction because the Michigan courts had indicated that
the state's search and seizure provision would be interpreted harmoniously with the Supreme
Court's reading of the fourth amendment when searches and seizures of narcotics were involved.
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pelled the Court to presume that ambiguous state court decisions rest
on adequate and independent state grounds. 1°4 In Justice Stevens'
view, federalism concerns, the risk of producing advisory opinions, and
"sound management of scarce federal judicial resources" militated
against the majority's presumption that ambiguous state court decisions
rest on federal law.' 5 He asserted that no compelling reason exists for
the Court to review state court decisions that uphold a citizen's asser-
tion of rights protected under both state and federal law. 0 6 According
to Justice Stevens, the Court should concern itself solely with vindica-
tion of federal rights that state courts have refused to protect.t0 7 Justice
Stevens concluded that the Court's desire for uniformity'0 simply did
not warrant alteration of the nonfederal ground doctrine. 0 9
Although the Court's holding in Long clarifies a murky area of fed-
eral jurisdiction, it also raises theoretical and practical problems for the
nonfederal grounds doctrine. 110 By subjecting a larger number of state
court decisions exhibiting ambiguous grounds of decision to Supreme
Court review, the Long Court's presumption of jurisdiction may in-
crease the risk of rendering advisory opinions.'' Supreme Court re-
view of a state court decision resting on both state and federal grounds
leaves the state court free on remand to reinstate its judgment on the
state ground. Supreme Court review of a federal issue in an ambiguous
case therefore may not affect the outcome of the case." 2 If, however,
Id at 3483 n.l (Brennan, J., with whom Marshall, J., joins dissenting); see supra note 100. Justices
Brennan and Marshall dissented on the merits. 103 S. Ct. at 3483-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
104. 103 S. Ct. at 3489 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Id at 3490 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Id In Justice Stevens' view, a federal interest arises only when a state denies its citizens a
federal right. The desire of a Michigan court to accord its citizens enhanced procedural rights
should be of no more interest to the Court than, in Justice Stevens' analogy, the Republic of
Finland's desire to "overprotect" its citizens. Id
107. Id
108. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
109. 103 S. Ct. at 3491 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens asserted that "the 'need for
uniformity in federal law' is truly an ungovernable engine. That same need is no less present
when it is perfectly clear that a state ground is both independent and adequate." Id
110. See infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (Long Court's inattention to advisory opinion
doctrine). The concern that the Court's decision will not affect the outcome of the case historically
has been one of the Court's principal reasons for declining jurisdiction of state court decisions
exhibiting ambiguous grounds of decision. See Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380
U.S. 194, 198 (1965); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945); supranotes 63-66 and accompany-
ing text.
112. Commentators have observed that the rationale underlying the advisory opinion doctrine
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state courts respond to Long by plainly stating the grounds for their
decisions, the Long rule will reduce the risk of advisory opinions. In
this view, Supreme Court review of state court decisions resting on fed-
eral issues will preclude state courts from reinstating their decisions on
remand.
The Long rule also detracts from the Court's ability to employ vari-
ous methods to implement the nonfederal grounds doctrine. 3 Prior to
Long, the Court used various approaches to sharpen ambiguous is-
sues,"' delay consideration, clarify the state court's ruling," 5 or avoid
decision entirely."I6 Long's rigid presumption may sacrifice this flexi-
bility for clarity and uniformity.
Long's effect on the independence of state law is more difficult to
gauge." 7 The "plain statement rule" imposes a high standard on state
courts."i8 If a state court wishes to insulate its judgment from Supreme
Court review, its decision must indicate "clearly and expressly that it is
alternatively based on a bona fide separate, adequate, and independent
state ground."" 9 Each element of this standard presents a question of
definition. For example, the Supreme Court might doubt the bona
fides of a state court decision that concludes, after exclusively relying
is inapplicable to the adequate and independent state grounds rule. See Bice, Anderson and the
Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. Rv. 750, 765 (1972); Sandalow, supra note 38, at 203.
These commentators note that the advisory opinion doctrine traditionally ensures that a court's
decision rests on an adversary presentation of the issues and a concrete fact situation. These
concerns are not present when the Court decides a federal issue that may not be dispositive of the
parties' rights. Thus although the Long rule may not preclude the Court from rendering opinions
that do not determine the outcome of the case, little chance exists that the Long presumption will
result in the Court's delivering opinions on "sterilized and mutilated issues." See Frankfurter, A
Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1006 (1924).
113. See supra notes 48-69 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194, 200-01 (1965) (Court
sought clarification from state court in case involving statute imposing liability for support of
indigent state mental patients on relatives because of "importance and widespread interest in the
case"); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 27, at 482-83.
115. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1945) (Supreme Court should ask, rather
than tell, a state court what it held).
116. See, e.g., Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956) (Court dismissed California
Supreme Court judgment which allowed discharge of an employee because she was a communist
even though state decision seemed to rest solely on federal grounds); Note, supra note 48, at 844,
849.
117. The Long Court observed that its new approach would "provide state judges with a
clearer opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by federal interference." 103 S. Ct.
at 3476.
118. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
119. 103 S. Ct. at 3476; see supra note 99 (quoting the Long Court's plain statement rule).
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on federal precedents, that a challenged action violated the state
constitution.' 20
Other problems are foreseeable in those states whose highest state
court announces as a matter of policy that the state's constitution oper-
ates independently of federal law.'2 ' The Court did not indicate in
Long whether it would accept broad state court assertions of inde-
pendence. 122 The Court may insist that state courts reassert the inde-
pendence of their constitutions in every decision interpreting
overlapping questions of state and federal law. 123  Supreme Court re-
view of a particular decision therefore may depend on the state court's
mechanical reassertion of independent state grounds.' 24
Although the Supreme Court's implementation of the plain state-
ment rule may result in an intrusion on the province of the state
courts, 125 the Long holding also could encourage greater independence
for state law. 126 Long places the responsibility for the assertion of state
law independence directly upon state court judges and indirectly upon
state legislatures and citizens. Under the Long rule, each state court is
responsible for deciding whether its interpretations of important state
constitutional provisions will diverge from interpretations of corre-
sponding provisions of the federal constitution. After Long, a state
court abdicates its responsibility to make this choice if it decides a
120. Prior to Long the Court probably would have assumed jurisdiction in such a case. See,
e.g., Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 671 (1982) (the Court, after reviewing an Oregon Court of
Appeals decision that cited several Supreme Court cases and one state case, observed that the state
case actually was based on federal precedent and therefore the possible state ground was not
independent).
121. At least one state made such an announcement prior to Long, only to have its declaration
ignored in the Supreme Court. See supra note 87 (discussing State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673
(S.D. 1976) and the Supreme Court's failure to take notice in South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct.
916 (1983)). Other state courts have made post-Long declarations of independence. See, e.g.,
State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347 (N.H. 1983); State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 271, 666 P.2d 1316, 1323
(1983).
122. The Court's language in Long speaks of the requirement that state court decisions, rather
than state courts themselves, make a "plain statement" of the basis for decision. See 103 S. Ct. at
3476; see also supra text accompanying note 119.
123. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
124. See Collins, supra note 100, at 93 (arguing that the Supreme Court will require a "plain
statement" in every state decision).
125. See Collins, supra note 100, at 92 (arguing that requirement of plain statement will in-
crease Court's ability to upset state court decisions protecting individual rights).
126. See, e.g., State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash.2d 814, 818, 676 P.2d 419, 422 (1984) (plain state-
ment rule will "foster the development of state law free from federal interference"); infra notes
127-28 and accompanying text.
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question of constitutional law on ambiguous grounds.1 7
State court reaction to Long also will determine the plain statement
rule's contribution to judicial efficiency.'12  If problems in defining the
elements of the rule do not impede the Court, 9 its application will
simplify the Court's jurisdictional determinations. In addition, the
plain statement rule should conserve judicial resources by eliminating
time-consuming remands and continuances.13 0  If, however, state
courts choose to render decisions grounded in the federal constitution,
the number of cases over which the Court potentially has jurisdiction
will increase.' 3 '
III. THE STATE RESPONSE
A. Possible State Responses
Prior to Michigan v. Long, state courts could use the adequate and
independent state grounds doctrine to insulate their decisions from
political and judicial review. 132 In most instances, if the state court
rested its decision on both state and federal law, the Supreme Court
would decline review. 133 At the same time, the federal basis for the
decisions discouraged state legislatures from acting to change state laws
127. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255, 264-65 (Mont. 1983) (Shea, J., dissenting) (am-
biguous majority decision constitutes abdication of court's responsibility to maintain inde-
pendence of state constitution); State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316, 1323 (1983) (state
courts should not abdicate their responsibility for maintaining independent state constitutional
guarantees); Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 806 (rex. Crim. App. 1983) (Teague, J., dissenting)
(blind adherence to Supreme Court interpretations is an abdication of the court's role as final
arbiter of state law).
128. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
130. See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3475 (discussing delay as a rationale for modifying
nonfederal grounds doctrine).
131. The Court recently has exhibited a preference for reviewing state court decisions that
accord defendants enhanced rights under the federal constitution. In 1982, for example, the Court
granted four out of ten petitions in which the state sought review of a state court decision sus-
taining a defendant's claim. In the same year, the Court did not review any cases brought by a
defendant claiming a state court denial of a constitutional right. Collins, supra note 100, at 92
(citing Welsh, *hose Federalism?-The Burger Court's Treatment of State Civil Liberties Judg-
ments, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 819 (1984)); see also Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1855
(1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting Court's tendency in criminal cases to grant prosecution's
petition for certiorari and then to reverse summarily a lower court's reversal of a conviction).
132. See Bice, supra note 112, at 757.
133. See, e.g., Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965); Jankovich v.
Indiana Toll Road Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487 (1965); Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson, 293 U.S. 52
(1934). But see, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (state court
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that supported the decisions.1 34 Thus the nonfederal grounds doctrine
historically has encouraged state court independence and
irresponsibility.
State courts now must make their decisions subject to review by state
political authorities or by the Supreme Court.135  Depending on the
state court's response, a state's law will become either inextricably in-
terwoven with federal law, or, beyond federal minimum guarantees,
independently determined by the state's legislature and judiciary.1 36
Michigan v. Long thus poses a challenge to the states.
States can respond to this challenge in essentially two ways. First, a
state can require its courts, by constitutional amendment137 or judicial
fiat,' 38 to harmonize their interpretations of the state constitution with
decision resting on both state and federal law is subject to Supreme Court review because state
court felt constrained to rule as it did by federal law).
134. See Bice, supra note 112, at 757. But see Falk, supra note 82, at 276 (arguing that
Supreme Court review of state court decisions grounded in state and federal law would place
undue political pressure on state courts if the Supreme Court reversed the federal law holding).
135. A decision on state grounds alone leaves the court's decision open to review by the state
political process. See infra note 137. A decision on federal grounds or on ambiguous grounds
now allows for Supreme Court review. Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476 (1983); see supra
notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (amendment to search and seizure provision of Florida
Constitution requires Florida courts to construe provision "in conformity with the 4th Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court"); see
also Florida v. Casal, 103 S. Ct. 3100, 3101-02 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (endorsing Florida
constitutional amendment as a step toward guaranteeing "rational law enforcement"). In Califor-
nia, the electorate has passed a constitutional amendment of narrower scope but similar effect. In
1974, in response to the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628,
493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972), that capital punishment consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment under the California Constitution, the people of California
added art. I, § 27 to the state constitution, overturning Anderson. See. CAL. Co NsT. art. I, § 27.
See generally Collins, Quarrels, Quotas and Darwinism: What's Happening in State Courts, Nat'l
L.J., Jan. 2, 1984, at 20, col 4 & n.19.
Although these amendments seem to bring state law into accord with federal law, decisions
grounded in these amendments may not raise federal questions. A Florida court decision, for
example, based solely on the Florida search and seizure provision would not be reivewable by the
Supreme Court if it did not restrict federally guaranteed rights. The remedy for such a state court
misinterpretation of federal law would rest with the state's legislature, not with the Supreme
Court. Cf Bice, supra note 112, at 757; supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255, 258, 260 (Mont. 1983) (Montana constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination affords no greater protection than fifth amendment privilege);
Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (court interprets state constitution
consistently with Supreme Court's interpretations of fourth amendment).
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federal precedents. 139 States adopting this approach presume that cer-
tain state constitutional guarantees should not assume independent via-
bility or significance. 140
This presumption ignores the possibility that a state court interpreta-
tion of a state constitution might take local considerations into ac-
count.14 1 Even if a state court decision clearly depended on such local
factors, applying this harmonizing approach precludes a state decision
from resting on an independent nonfederal ground and subjects the
decision to federal review. Moreover, given the vast number of new
fact patterns confronting a state court each year, 42 the feasibility of
achieving complete accord with federal precedents by implementing
this approach seems doubtful.
State courts can also respond to Long by declaring that state law is
independent of federal law, either as a matter of general policy or in
specific cases. The Long Court clearly contemplated the latter alterna-
tive. 4  This selective approach has the advantage of allowing a state
139. This approach is defensible on the ground that most state constitutional provisions derive
from and are identical to those in the federal constitution. See supra notes 137 & 138.
140. See State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255, 260 (Mont. 1983) (finding no indication that the
framers of the Montana constitution's privilege against self-incrimination intended it to be differ-
ent from the fifth amendment privilege). But see People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880,
100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972) (court found that the framers of California's
constitutional prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment intended that the provision have a
meaning separate from eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment);
State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347 (N.H. 1983) (New Hampshire constitutional ban on unreasonable
searches and seizures predates the fourth amendment to the federal constitution and thus does not
necessarily accord the same protection); State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, -, 676 P.2d 419,
422 (1984) (difference in wording of state search and seizure provision justifies difference in
meaning).
141. See Deyelopments in the Law, supra note 28, at 1360-61 & nn.144-48 (referring to local
considerations as "state-specific" factors, and listing as examples distinctive state constitutional
provisions, the state's history, established state precedents, and "distinctive attitudes of a state's
citizenry"); see also id at 1360 n.142 (noting commentators who emphasize the importance of
these factors).
142. In 1982, for example, over twelve million criminal cases were filed in state courts. Michi-
gan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3477 n.8 (1983) (citing 7 STATE COURT J. 18 (1983)).
143. See id at 3476. The Court in Long referred to state court decisions rather than state
courts themselves. For example, in its formulation of the plain statement rule, the Court declared
that "state court decisions" must clearly indicate that they are based on state law. Id See supra
notes 119 & 123 and accompanying text.
State courts seem to be responding to Long by issuing "plain statements" of state law indepen-
dence on a decision-by-decision basis. A number of state courts recently have included a simple
footnote stating that the court's decision rested on an independent state ground. See, e.g., State v.
Ferrell, 191 Conn. 37, n.12, 463 A.2d 573, 578 n.12 (1983); State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 217 n.3,
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court to determine when state policies or practices make it advisable to
deviate from federal precedents. 44 In addition, a state court an-
nouncement of independence as a matter of general policy probably
would not preclude Supreme Court review of ambiguous state court
decisions. 145  Supreme Court acceptance of a general declaration of
state law independence would subvert the plain statement rule because
the Court would review decisions from states with a general policy of
independence only if it found a plain statement that a decision rested
on federal law. 146
B. Michigan v. Long: Federalism and Flexibiliy
The Court's holding in Michigan v. Long4 7 arguably intrudes on
state court authority to offer criminal dcfendants greater procedural
protection than the federal constitution mandates. 48  In addition, the
Court's consideration of the relationship of the advisory opinion doc-
trine to the plain statement rule is seriously flawed. 149  Yet, flexible
Court administration of the Long rule will serve the federalism and
463 A.2d 320, 324 n.3 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1295 (1984); InreT.R. 465, 502 Pa. 165, 167
n.3, 465 A.2d 642, 643 n.3 (1983).
144.- See infra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of state policies in
formulating state guarantees that are independent of the federal constitution).
145. Seesupranotes 87 & 89 (discussing Supreme Court's refusal to accept general declaration
by the South Dakota Supreme Court that the South Dakota Constitution has an "independent
nature"). The Supreme Court of New Hampshire and the Supreme Court of Oregon have made
similar general policy declarations. See State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 352 (N.H. 1983); State v.
Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 267, 666 P.2d 1316, 1321 (1983).
146. As an alternative to a general declaration of independence, a state court could resolve all
state law claims presented by the parties before considering any federal claims. Under this ap-
proach, however, state law would not be dispositive of the case. See, e.g., State v. Ball, 471 A.2d
347 (N.H. 1983). This two-step approach is similar to a proposal Justice Marshall suggested in
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 729 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall contended
that the Court should not review a state court decision unless the state court has resolved all
possible state law issues. See Galie & Galie, supra note 10 (discussing Justice Marshall's propo-
sal); supra note 89 (discussing Justice Marshall's Hass dissent); see also Paschall v. Christie-Stew-
art Co., 414 U.S. 100 (1973) (per curiam) (Court vacated state court decision and remanded for
consideration of state law issue that Court itself discovered and that might have been dispositive
of the case); cf. Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2090-91 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgment) (arguing that state supreme court should resolve the meaning of state constitutional
provisions before it ventures into federal law).
147. 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983); see supra notes 90-109 and accompanying text.
148. Id at 3490 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Collins, supra note 100, at 92 (criticizing
Court's intrusion as "lopsided federalism").
149. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
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jurisdictional interests protected by the adequate and independent state
grounds rule.
The Long rule furthers federalism interests in several distinct ways.
First, it will delineate clearly the respective spheres of state and federal
law. State law will become either independent of or congruent with
federal law. 150 Second, the Court's holding in Long enhances the abil-
ity of state courts to experiment in the development of new principles
of constitutional law.'5' State courts may perceive that state history
and conditions compel an expansion of federal guarantees.152 State
judges who interpret state constitutions expansively will, however, be
subject to possible restrictions imposed by the political process.153
Third, the Long rule undermines Justice Stevens' argument that the
Court should not concern itself with state court decisions that uphold
assertions of federal rights. 5 Unambiguous state court declarations of
the basis for their decisions will limit Supreme Court jurisdiction to
review of decisions grounded in federal law. Although the Court can
implement federal policies most effectively by reviewing decisions that
deny federal rights, review of state court decisions that broaden federal
constitutional rights does not intrude upon the independence of state
law.
These federalism concerns dictate that the Supreme Court accept at
face value state court "plain statements" that a decision independently
rests on state law. If the Court regularly scrutinizes and rejects state
court announcements that a decision rests on state law, the clarity and
consistency the Long Court sought to achieve will remain unrealized. 155
150. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347 (N.H.
1983)).
153. For a discussion of the role of the political process in connection with the adequate and
independent state grounds doctrine, see supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text and note 137.
State court judges also may hesitate to assert independence because of another aspect of the
political process: the vote. Only three states provide their judges with the same kind of tenure and
salary protection that federal judges enjoy. See De'elopments in the Law, supranote 30, at 1351-52
& n.92 (asserting that lack of state judge independence may make these judges more responsive to
the popular will).
154. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
155. But see Colorado v. Nunez, 104 S. Ct. 1257 (1984). In Nunez the Court dismissed a writ
of certiorari after concluding that the Supreme Court of Colorado based its decision on an in-
dependent state ground. Justice White concurred in the dismissal, but expressed his opinion that
federal law mandated the result reached by the Colorado court. Id at 1257-59 (White, J., concur-
ring in dismissal of certiorari). In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens characterized Justice White's
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Similarly, the Court must not set too low the standard for finding a
plain statement. If the Court finds plain statements and thus independ-
ent state grounds in every state court citation to state law, the opportu-
nities for clarifying federal law will decrease, and the Court's role in
the federal system will shrink. Pre-Long precedent indicates that this
result is improbable. 5 6
In addition, state court response to Long is vital to the Long rule's
smooth operation and to the preservation of the federal-state balance
fostered by the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine. The
advantages of the Long rule will not materialize if state courts continue
to hold in sweeping terms that challenged actions violate both the state
and federal constitutions. The danger of advisory opinions will remain
constant, 57 the burdens on judicial efficiency will continue,"5 8 and the
respective spheres of state and federal law will remain undefined. 15 9
Finally, the Supreme Court must apply the Long rule flexibly. The
Court noted in Long that it may employ pre-Long methods of disposi-
tion 60 when "necessary and desirable."' 6' The Court should not hesi-
tate to seek clarification of ambiguous state court decisions when it will
serve other jurisdictional policies. 62 Thus, for example, the Court
could vacate and remand a state court decision when the parties have
opinion as advisory and intrusive on state law. Id at 1259 (Stevens, J., concurring in dismissal of
certiorari). See also Florida v. Casal, 103 S. Ct. 3100 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring in dismissal
of certiorari) (arguing that suppression of seized marijuana under the Florida Constitution not
required by federal law or Supreme Court decisions); Collins, Justice Stevens Becomes Advocate of
States' Role in the High Courts, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 27, 1984, at 20, col. 3 (Justice White's Nunez
opinion a "classic example of an advisory opinion").
156. See e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568 (1977); supra
notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 63-66 & 111-12 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 48-69 and accompanying text.
161. Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476 n.6 (1983).
162. In Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole, 104 S. Ct. 2144 (1984) (per curiam), the Court
indicated that it has not abandoned pre-Long methods of disposition. In Toole, the Court granted
certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the state court for clarification. Id
The Court reviewed the case after the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had denied, without opin-
ion, a newspaper's request for a writ of prohibition against a judge who had barred the press from
a criminal trial. The Court stated that it was unable to determine if the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had refused to address the federal question or had grounded its decision on state law. See
also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241 (1978) (Pennsylvania court denied
petition for writ of mandamus; Court vacated and remanded for clarification).
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failed to present clearly the issue to the state court. 163 This action
would reduce frivolous attempts to obtain Supreme Court review. In
addition, the Court could use dismissal to force state courts to adhere to
the plain statement rule.'" Denial of Supreme Court review could mo-
tivate state attorneys general who are unable to have their cases heard
to pressure state courts for a clear statement of the grounds of decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the Supreme Court intended its decision in Michigan v. Long to
clarify the adequate and independent state ground doctrine, then it has
succeeded. 16  If the Court intended the Long presumption to extend
Supreme Court review to a greater number of state court decisions or to
enhance Supreme Court leadership in important areas of constitutional
law, then the Court may not achieve its goal. The Long rule can aid the
Court in achieving uniformity of federal law by simplifying identifica-
tion of state court decisions that apply federal law. The Supreme
Court's role as the definer of constitutional guarantees may diminish,
however, if state courts elect to ensure the independence of their own
constitutions.' 66 An independent state court response to Long will re-
strict Supreme Court review of state court decisions and reduce the
number of new fact situations in which the Court can articulate its
views of constitutional law. Rather than uniformity, Long will achieve
disparity between federal and state interpretations of similar constitu-
tional provisions. To the extent that the rule of Michigan v. Long pro-
motes federalism values, it prevents the Supreme Court from
maintaining its leadership role in the definition of constitutional rights.
J Douglas Wilson
163. Cf. e.g., Lynch v. New York ex rel Pierson, 293 U.S. 53, 55 (1934) (Court dismissed
because parties failed to carry burden of affirmatively showing Court's jurisdiction).
164. Cf. Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2089 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) (castigating state supreme court for failing to provide a plain statement and thus invit-
ing Supreme Court review).
165. See supra notes 97 & 101 and accompanying text.
166, See supra notes 121-24 & 143-46 and accompanying text.
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